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Abstract 
This paper examines the active re-construction of indigenous identities within the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia through the case study of a resource conflict that arose with the government’s announcement of its 
intention to build a road through a national park and indigenous territory, the Territorio Indígena y Parque 
Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS; Indigenous Territory and Isiboro Sécure National Park). Ethnographic 
fieldwork shows that both the state and the lowland indigenous movement have fashioned essentialised 
understandings of an indigenous identity linked to the environment in order to legitimise competing 
resource sovereignty claims.  
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In Latin America, a post-neoliberal trend has emerged that could be said to constitute ‘21st 
century socialism’ (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011: 267). Nonetheless, for Bolivians this shift has 
not resulted in significant movement away from an economic model based on the exploitation of 
natural resources. Rather than being post-extractivist, social ecologist Eduardo Gudynas argues 
that the government of Evo Morales advances a type of neoextractivismo progresista 
(progressive neo-extractivism) that gains popular support by nationalising extractive industries 
and redistributing State revenues (Gudynas, 2012: 132). However, this model of national 
development reifies understandings of progress based on the colonial domination of nature and 
negates alternative understandings of territoriality, governance and development postulated by 
many indigenous peoples. A number of scholars have addressed examples of resource struggles 
in Bolivia and argued that the extraction of non-renewable resources alongside major 
infrastructural projects comes at the expense of indigenous territorial rights and environmental 
sustainability (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012; Perreault, 2012; Stefanoni, 2012; 
Hindery, 2013).  
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Contrasting ideas of territoriality, democracy and progress manifested during a conflict that 
erupted in 2011 over the Bolivian government’s plans to build a road through the Isiboro Sécure 
Indigenous Territory and National Park, known more commonly as the TIPNIS (Territorio 
Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure). The lowland indigenous organisation Confederación 
de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB; Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia) 
protested the plans in an historic march to the capital city of La Paz, where they were greeted by 
tens of thousands of supporters. People arriving on the capital’s streets revealed exasperation 
over the apparent contradictions within the discourse of the Movimiento al Socialismo Party 
(MAS; Movement Towards Socialism) supporting environmental and indigenous rights alongside 
a neo-extractivist development model. This pressure forced the government’s annulment of the 
project on 24 October 2011, under Ley No. 180.  
In the first section of the article I discuss the antecedents of the MAS Party in order to 
contextualise the current TIPNIS conflict. I then outline the background of CIDOB to 
demonstrate the importance of cultural politics in resource struggles and demands for indigenous 
territoriality, before outlining the ethnographic methodology used in this study. The final and 
main section analyses the empirical findings to evaluate the ‘legitimacy politics’ (Andolina, 
2003: 725) surrounding different and competing resource sovereignty demands. I adopt social 
anthropologist John-Andrew McNeish’s definition of resource sovereignties as ‘inter-connecting 
understandings of territoriality, identity, rights, use and nature’ (McNeish, 2011: 20). The 
TIPNIS conflict illuminates the following three political discourses: (a) government claims for 
resource nationalism; (b) CIDOB’s demands for indigenous territoriality; and (c) articulations of 
soberanía popular del pueblo (popular sovereignty of the people). I conclude by arguing that the 
coupling of essentialised articulations of indigeneity with identities of the ‘ecologically noble 
savage’ (Redford, 1991: 24) has served to further the public claims-making of both the Bolivian 
government and CIDOB, marking a new era in Bolivian politics.  
The TIPNIS Conflict and the Declining Legitimacy of the MAS  
The MAS Party, organised as a ‘party of social movements’, came to presidential office in 2006 
with the express goal of acting as a political instrument for the sovereignty of the people (Dangl, 
2010: 9). The rise of the MAS was made possible through the power of social movements headed 
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by Evo Morales, the well-known peasant-indigenous leader of the coca-growing union (Webber, 
2011). The foundations for this development were laid during the insurrectionary cycle of 2000–
2005 when the ‘Water and Gas Wars’ managed to overthrow two presidents and oust a 
transnational corporation in an upsurge of popular resistance to neoliberal hegemony (Kohl and 
Farthing, 2006). One of the key components of these resource conflicts was the demand for 
popular sovereignty and the recovery of Bolivian ownership and control of natural resources 
(Haarstad, 2009). The term ‘sovereignty’ has been central to the MAS who have married broadly 
felt anti-neoliberal sentiments with an expansive language of indigeneity in order to gain popular 
support (Albro, 2005). The project of the MAS has been marked by an ability to cross-cut class 
and ethnic identities and subsume heterogeneous identities under an ‘indigenous nationalism’ 
(Stefanoni, 2006: 37).  
A core agenda of the MAS has been the transformation of the Republic into the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, ratified in the new 2009 Constitution. Plurinationalism can be defined as ‘a state 
that merges constitutive sovereignty rooted in the national people (pueblo) and indigenous 
plurality and self-determination’ (Gustafson, 2009: 987). On the one hand, national sovereignty 
has been shaped by a number of nationalisations. Most notable is the nationalisation of the 
hydrocarbons industry announced in Decree 28701 on 1 May 2006. The introduction to the 
decree states that nationalisation will ‘reclaim our natural riches as a fundamental base to 
recuperate our sovereignty’ (cited in Haarstad, 2009: 178). On the other hand, indigenous 
plurality has been recognised and territorial rights granted under the new Constitution that names 
36 national ethnic languages alongside Spanish. The Constitution offers unprecedented 
indigenous rights, such as territorial self-determination and autonomy (Art. 2) and recognises 
indigenous groups’ cultures and world-visions, as well as their political, legal and economic 
structures (Art. 30). Furthermore, Article 30 guarantees prior consultation in regard to the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources within indigenous territories (Asamblea Constituyente, 
2008).  
However, as Morales comes to the end of his second term of office and prepares to face the 2014 
presidential elections, tensions are running high over the perceived failures or contradictions of 
the MAS project. In particular, debates have arisen over interpretations of development, 
environmental governance and resource management leading to land and resource sovereignty 
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conflicts, the principle example being the proposal to create a road through the TIPNIS (Figure 
1). Although the government argued that the project is necessary to integrate Bolivia’s eastern 
and western regions, the fact that the proposed road would cut through the heart of the national 
park hints at hidden agendas. Three broad motives have been suggested (cf. McNeish, 2013). 
First, the cocaleros (coca growers) want greater access to the park to expand cultivation. Second, 
the road is part of the Iniciativa para la Integracion de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana 
(Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure in South America), for an inter-
oceanic highway to provide Brazil with better access to markets in China (FOBOMADE, 2011). 
Third, the road provides better access for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. The 
Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA; Centre for the Study of 
Labour and Agrarian Development), has discovered that hydrocarbon exploration concessions 
have been granted to 25.5 percent of the area of the TIPNIS, with 17.7 percent granted to a single 
enterprise: YPFB Petroandina SAM, a joint enterprise of the national oil company Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB; Bolivian State Oil Fields), and Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA; Petroleum of Venezuela) established in 2008, during the Morales administration 
(CEDLA, 2012). It is therefore evident that the road is intimately tied in to the MAS’s economic 
model based on the appropriation of land and natural resources.  
The TIPNIS carries a dual status as an important protected zone of national importance 
(designated a national park under Supreme Decree 7401 in 1965) and as a territory that is home 
to the Yuracaré, Chimane and Mojeño-Trinitario indigenous peoples. The project has 
contradicted government legislation on two fronts. First, the government have ignored concerns 
raised in the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment prepared in 2011 by the Servicio 
Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SERNAP; National Service of Protected Areas) (SERNAP – 
Rumbol, 2011). Moreover, the route of the proposed road cuts through the Core Zone of the park 
as defined in the management plan formulated by SERNAP and the indigenous communities of 
the TIPNIS (Figure 1). The Core Zone is an area of high biodiversity where any type of 
commercial exploitation of natural resources is prohibited as well as ‘any activity or 
infrastructure that alters or modifies habitats (e.g. construction of infrastructure, hydrocarbon 
exploitation)’ (SERNAP, 2005: 106). Second, the government did not fulfil the obligatory prior 
consultation process, having signed the contract to secure financing from the Banco Nacional de 
Desarrollo Económico y Social (BNDES; Social Brazilian Development Bank) on 15 February 
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2011 without adequate consultation with TIPNIS communities. This is part of a broader trend in 
Latin American countries such as Peru and Ecuador ‘that translates into replays of long histories 
of colonialism, of violent incorporation of peripheries, and of resource dependence’ (Bebbington 
and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011: 142).  
Figure 1. Route of the Proposed Road through the TIPNIS.  
 
Source: Created by Andrew Singleton (School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow) for this research 
project based on public data from SERNAP (2005)  
It is perhaps unsurprising then that the original indigenous victory of the march was later 
undermined. On 10 February 2012 the government announced Ley No. 222, placing the road 
project back on the agenda. This forced CIDOB to set out on another protest march in late April 
2012, which I shall discuss in the empirical section of the article.  
Politics of Indigeneity in the Lowland Indigenous Movement  
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CIDOB has been at the forefront of organising opposition to the road project. The umbrella 
organisation was founded in 1982 and now represents the 34 indigenous nations of the Amazon 
Basin and Chaco (Yashar, 2005; Postero, 2007a). CIDOB united diverse ethnic communities in a 
political project for the legal protection of indigenous lands in the face of increasing colonisation 
through farming, logging, coca growing and the exploitation of hydrocarbons. These demands 
revolved around the concept of territorio (territory), which ‘became an icon of indigenous-state 
relations’ (Postero, 2007a: 49).  
Figure 2. Route of the Indigenous Marches in Defence of the TIPNIS.  
 
Source: Created by Les Hill (School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow) for this research project  
In 1990, CIDOB set out on an indigenous march from the Amazonian city of Trinidad to the 
highland capital of La Paz, designated the march for el territorio y la dignidad (territory and 
dignity). This march led to three executive decrees (22609, 22610 and 22611) that gave legal 
recognition to indigenous territories, including the TIPNIS (Jones, 1990: 5). Since 1990 a further 
eight marches have been organised to demand further rights to territory, self-determination and 
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autonomy. The marches in defence of the TIPNIS are the eighth and ninth of their kind and 
follow the route of the historic 1990 march, around 600 km in distance (Figure 2).  
CIDOB arose in a global climate of ‘indigenism’ that sought to recognise indigenous rights under 
international frameworks such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 
169, ratified by Bolivia in 1991, and the later United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (Brysk, 2000; Canessa, 2006). Both recognise the right for 
indigenous peoples to be consulted in decision-making on development proposals. CIDOB has 
additionally shaped and been shaped by a multicultural turn that led to reforms of the state during 
the 1990s to accommodate indigenous demands and recognise the multiethnic nature of Latin 
American societies (Van Cott, 2000; Sieder, 2002). In 1994, the reorientation of the political 
landscape due to international rights legislation and ethnic demands prompted a change in the 
Constitution to declare Bolivia a ‘multiethnic and pluricultural’ nation. Moreover, neoliberal 
reform measures decentralised government institutions through the 1994 Ley de Participación 
Popular (Law of Popular Participation). As well as providing greater autonomy to municipal 
institutions, the Ley provided a means of indigenous political representation through 
Organizaciónes Territoriales de Base (Grassroots Territorial Organisations) (Kohl, 2002; 
Regalsky, 2010). Furthermore, in 1996 an agrarian reform law granted legal collective land titles 
to what are known as TCOs (Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen; Original Communal Land) (Postero, 
2007a).  
However, Yashar has argued that the neoliberal frameworks of multiculturalism resulted in ‘the 
penetration of the state into the Amazon’ having ‘challenged indigenous territorial autonomy that 
had previously survived in the absence of a historically viable state’ (Yashar, 2005: 153). The 
failure of neoliberal reforms to grant adequate recognition of local autonomous forms and self-
determination has resulted in increasing demands by CIDOB for participation, through their own 
organisational bodies, in the political, social, economic and cultural decisions taken in the 
country thereby ‘rethinking the homogenizing and liberal precepts of contemporary citizenship 
regimes and the state’ (Yashar, 2005: 285). In the TIPNIS conflict, CIDOB has demanded the 
government’s practical application of plurinationalism to incorporate plural understandings of 
development, democracy and resource management.  
During the TIPNIS conflict several of CIDOB’s political objectives have relied on the 
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legitimisation of indigenous identity claims through, for example, assumptions that indigenous 
people have a unique relationship to nature. In his 1991 article ‘The Ecologically Noble Savage’, 
Redford argued that scientists and advocates of indigenous rights during the 1980s revived 
notions of the idealised ‘noble savage’, this time with a distinctly ecological quality. McNeish 
(2013) argues that this association remains prevalent within intellectual assessments and media 
attention surrounding the TIPNIS controversy, despite the fact that academic literature, especially 
within anthropology, has contested the suggestion that there is an intrinsic relationship between 
indigenous peoples and nature (cf. Diamond, 1986; Colchester, 1994; Krech, 1999). McNeish 
asserts that these simplifications are dangerous as they ignore the fact that the indigenous peoples 
of the lowlands are involved in processes of resource extraction, globalisation and development. 
McNeish’s cautionary reminder is key to critical assessments of indigenous eco-politics. 
Nevertheless, it is important to contextualise indigenous identity claims within the broader 
climate of contemporary state–indigenous relations. Doing so reveals a new dynamic in 
indigenous politics, namely that for the first time in Bolivian history the government is also 
engaged in indigenous eco-politics in order to justify its own brand of resource nationalism. 
Thus, lowland indigenous identities are not formed in a political vacuum but counteract 
government projects of extractive development that jeopardise the livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples within communally titled territories.  
Here, I examine how the strategic use of indigenous essentialism authenticates and makes 
legitimate different resource sovereignty claims. These articulations are part of a wider ‘cultural 
politics’ (Alvarez et al., 1998: 7). This involves ‘call and response interactions, where political 
communities contest and negotiate ideas that legitimate the political regime and political 
interests’ (Andolina, 2003: 725; original emphasis). Indeed, comprehending resource conflicts 
requires an approach that integrates politico-cultural understandings that entangle ‘meanings of 
development, citizenship and the nation itself’ (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 697). The 
performance of an identity narrative is intimately connected to other forms of identity 
construction, such as those mobilised by the state. In the case study of the TIPNIS conflict these 
interactions take place through ‘languages of contention’ (Roseberry, 1996: 83) that circulate 
around concepts such as vivir bien (living well), Pachamama (Mother Earth), soberanía nacional 
(national sovereignty), territorio indígena (indigenous territory), casa grande (big house) and 
soberanía popular del pueblo (popular sovereignty of the people).  
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Ethnographic Methodology  
This paper draws on ethnographic fieldwork with the lowland indigenous movement and urban 
solidarity campaigns during the TIPNIS conflict in order to understand the politics of 
representation and the internal dynamics and tensions of re-constructed identity-making. 
Ethnography was chosen as the method best able to describe the lived, subjective experiences of 
marginalisation, the construction of collective grievances and the formation of resistance from 
below. I also include an analytical treatment of government discourses taken from documentary 
sources in order to contextualise the narratives articulated by CIDOB.  
The nine-month research period in Bolivia was undertaken between September 2011 and June 
2012 using three methods. First, participant observation was initially carried out with the urban 
solidarity movement La Campaña en Defensa del TIPNIS (Campaign in Defence of the TIPNIS), 
based in Cochabamba. My involvement led to connections with movements in La Paz and Santa 
Cruz, as well as attendance at CIDOB meetings and events. These relationships led to my 
participation in the Eighth Indigenous March for two days on the descent into La Paz and on the 
Ninth Indigenous March for a total of six weeks, during which I walked, camped, cooked and 
lived alongside the indigenous participants. Second, I conducted 55 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews in Spanish (the lingua franca of the lowland indigenous movement) with indigenous 
leaders, protest marchers, NGO workers and urban solidarity activists. In this article I use the real 
names of well-known representatives, but omit other names to protect confidentiality. Third, 
documentary analysis of material gathered throughout the conflict was carried out in order to 
capture official narratives, as well as personal accounts and discussions. These documents 
included public announcements from the indigenous marches and CIDOB, urban campaign 
literature and articles from newspapers and from web-based media. Unless otherwise indicated, 
all translations from non-English texts or interviews are my own.  
Resource Sovereignties: Between the Pachamama and the Casa Grande  
Contrasting resource sovereignties were identified during the TIPNIS conflict. On the one hand, 
the Bolivian government has reified an essentialised Aymaran identity based on concepts such as 
vivir bien and Pachamama in order to justify a state-led model of resource nationalism. On the 
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other, the indigenous movement of the lowlands has fashioned demands for indigenous 
territoriality through notions of ecological sustainability. Both identities performed act to 
legitimise competing resource sovereignties by building connections with other sectors of the 
Bolivian population. However, this is a contentious process as both claims rub up against the 
demand for soberanía popular del pueblo pursued by movements on the political ‘Left’. This 
idea postulates that the ownership and governance of natural resources should be in the hands of 
the people and therefore questions the exclusionary nature of indigenous territoriality as well as 
the centralised decision-making being pursued by the MAS Party. The next sections discuss these 
competing resource sovereignties in turn.  
Resource Nationalism of the State: Pachamama and Vivir Bien  
The Morales administration has legitimised state-led resource nationalism through a popular 
discourse and imaginary arguing that capitalism is incompatible with environmental 
sustainability. This effectively amalgamates the notion of an environmentally sustainable model 
of development with indigenous identities through conceptualisations of the Pachamama and 
vivir bien, the Spanish name given to the Aymara worldview of suma qamaña (Gudynas, 2011). 
Vivir bien (more popularly known as buen vivir in Ecuador) describes a ‘system of knowledge 
and living based on the communion of humans and nature and on the spatial-temporal-
harmonious totality of existence’ (Walsh, 2010: 18). Gudynas argues that this perspective 
collapses the ‘classical Western dualism that separates society from Nature’ (2011: 444). 
However, both Gudynas (2011) and Walsh (2010) point out that the concept has been 
transformed across the Andean region to inform development narratives.  
State-led resource nationalism gains significant legitimacy based on popular sentiment that seeks 
national sovereignty over extractive industries, i.e. external to transnational corporations 
(Perreault and Valdivia, 2010). Postero has described this as ‘a national sovereignty free from the 
strictures that U.S. imperialism and neoliberal capitalism imposed’ (Postero, 2010: 24). David 
Choquehuanca, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has argued that the concept of vivir bien 
exists in contra-distinction to capitalism and the related concept of vivir mejor (living better). He 
describes the Andean world-vision as an ecologically balanced and culturally sensitive form of 
future development ‘to reclaim our life in complete harmony and mutual respect with mother 
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nature, with Pachamama [...] where we are all part of nature and there is nothing separate’ 
(Choquehuanca, 2010: 452).  
Morales has utilised these notions at an international level to critique discourses surrounding 
climate change policy. Bolivia was one of five countries that opposed the Copenhagen Accord at 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2009, arguing that 
the main cause of climate change – that is, capitalism – was not being addressed (Building 
Bridges Collective, 2010). At the conference, Morales made the most radical of all presidential 
leaders’ demands by advocating a one degree Centigrade limit on temperature rises and 
proposing an international court for climate crimes. He also introduced the concept of climate 
debt, suggesting that economically advanced countries compensate developing countries that bear 
the brunt of climate change whilst emitting minimal carbon emissions (Shultz, 2010). Like 
Choquehuanca, Morales has advocated vivir bien as an alternative development model. For 
instance, at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York in 2008, 
Morales issued a number of commandments to ‘save the planet, humanity and life’. The tenth 
commandment was ‘Vivir Bien’:  
Living Well is not to live better at the cost of another. Rather, it is to construct a 
communitarian socialism in harmony with Mother Earth. (Morales, 2010: 35; original 
text)  
The following year Morales brought together climate justice and anti-neoliberal movements in an 
alternative climate summit in Bolivia, the Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre el Cambio 
Climático y los Derechos de la Madre Tierra (World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change 
and the Rights of Mother Earth). The Bolivian president declared:  
We have two paths: either Pachamama or death. We have two paths: either capitalism dies 
or Mother Earth dies. Either capitalism lives or Mother Earth lives. Of course, brothers 
and sisters, we are here for life, for humanity and for the rights of Mother Earth. (cited in 
Webber, 2011: 156)  
Notions of the ‘indigenous’ MAS Party government as saviours of the climate have garnered a 
vast amount of symbolic capital for the current administration and its development strategies 
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amongst environmental advocates and intellectuals.  
Such imaginaries have been written into political legislation. For instance, the preamble to the 
2009 Constitution establishes the basis of the state as la búsqueda del vivir bien (the search for 
living well) (Asamblea Constituyente, 2008). Environmental rights have been broadened within 
the Constitution to include the obligation of economic organisations to protect the environment 
(Art. 312: III), the right of individuals to a healthy environment (Art. 33) and the duty of the state 
to promote the responsible use and industrialisation of natural resources alongside the 
preservation of the environment (Art. 9: VI). On 15 October 2012, the government also ratified 
the Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien (Framework Law of 
Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well). The law posits vivir bien as an 
alternative model to capitalism that is based on the world-visions of indigenous peoples (Art. 5: 
II).  
State-led resource nationalism gains widespread support by redistributing revenues through social 
welfare programmes (cf. Postero, 2013). This fits with Vice-President García Linera’s alternative, 
and somewhat less radical, understanding of vivir bien as ‘managing the tension between the 
protection of nature and productive development’ in order to ‘generate public resources that 
guarantee the population basic minimum conditions’ (cited in FOBOMADE, 2011: 129). 
Rhetoric draws on the Andean world-vision of vivir bien but appropriates and modifies its 
meaning in line with the pursuit of the neo-extractivist development model.  
National development, however, does not necessarily match up with the welfare of local 
communities who bear the burden of environmental and social costs caused by extraction and the 
construction of major infrastructure (Kohl and Farthing, 2012). Additionally, the MAS’s creation 
of a national identity is ‘decidedly Andean’ (Postero, 2007b: 21), disclaiming the world-visions 
of the historically more marginalised lowland indigenous peoples (Canessa, 2006). This echoes 
Sarah Radcliffe’s paper on the application of the development model of buen vivir in Ecuador, 
which argues that although the concept has the potential for radical transformations of 
mainstream development, legacies of colonialism remain entrenched within the Ecuadorian state 
and act to ‘reproduce postcolonial hierarchies of poverty, difference and exclusion’ (Radcliffe, 
2012: 248). A further criticism is that state-led nationalism does not distribute decision-making 
powers to the Bolivian people, leaving the demands for popular sovereignty unfulfilled (cf. Cuba, 
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2006; Quijano, 2006; Haarstad, 2009).  
Nonetheless, Postero argues that vivir bien is ‘not just a token rhetorical tool’ as it ‘has sufficient 
moral and cultural significance such that its insertion into the debate has changed the discursive 
and material field in which contestations over resources and distribution are occurring’ (Postero, 
2013: 90). It is within this climate of the politics of identity that we must situate lowland 
indigenous narratives that advance the idea that indigenous communities live in conformity with 
nature.  
Demands for Indigenous Territory: Amazonian Identities of the Casa Grande  
Mesa (Table) 18, an unofficial working group outside the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate 
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, was instigated by the highland indigenous organisation 
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ; National Council of Ayllus 
and Markas of Qollasuyu), which joined forces with social movements and Bolivian intellectuals 
to disclose the gap between the State’s external rhetoric on capitalism and environmental rights 
and internal practices of neo-extractivism (Building Bridges Collective, 2010). Mesa 18 
heightened public awareness of the tensions within the government’s development model and 
reoriented the key language of contention of indigenous political organising towards an emphasis 
on the ecological. As such, members of CIDOB have linked narratives of indigenous 
territoriality, and related concepts such as the casa grande, with associated claims to 
environmental sustainability. Just one month after the Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change, 
the corregidores (community leaders) of the TIPNIS declared a state of emergency in response to 
the government’s proposal to build a road through their TCO. In a public resolution dated 18 
May 2010, the importance of the protection of Madre Tierra, rather than the Andean concept of 
Pachamama, is repeatedly evoked. The document asserts the intimate connection of indigenous 
peoples to the environment:  
[ ... ] opening this road would present a threat to the lives of the peoples who inhabit the 
TIPNIS, due to the loss of natural resources and biodiversity upon which Mojeños, 
Yuracarés and Chimanes sustain their culture and life. (Extraordinary Meeting of 
Community Leaders of the TIPNIS No. 29, 2010)  
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Simultaneously, the resolution discredits the propaganda discourses of Morales’ government:  
[...] our President Evo Morales has constituted himself as the main defender of the rights 
of indigenous peoples and of the Madre Tierra [ ... ] We resolve [ ... ] to declare a state of 
emergency and immediate and permanent mobilisation in defence of our rights, territorial 
integrity and the rights of the Madre Tierra.  
Instead of utilising anti-neoliberal sentiment, the language of territorio indígena gains its 
legitimacy through international legal frameworks, as well as state legislation surrounding 
indigenous and environmental rights. Indigenous identities are re-constructed in order to resist 
and undermine dominant knowledges that serve to maintain particular systems of power 
relations, particularly state control of decisions surrounding resource use and exploitation. 
Interviewees participating in the Ninth March advanced the following definitions of territorio 
and the casa grande:  
[as] a titled territorio where no one will bother us, where you live in harmony with nature, 
you have self-determination within that territorio, [with] your own authorities, your own 
government. (Tomás Candia Yusupi, Secretary of Young People of CIDOB, 2 June 2012)  
The casa grande is where you can live comfortably. It is where, in the first place, you can 
decide the form of life that you want. This is the casa grande, that is offered to you by 
nature, it gives you traditional medicine, it gives you your daily food [ ... ] This [gestures 
around] is the fish and the fruit of the forest. So, I think that the casa grande invites you 
to be more respectful of nature and there is a balance between man and nature that you 
have to respect. (Adolfo Chávez, President of CIDOB, 27 May 2012)  
These two statements suggest that indigenous territory holds both a socio-ecological significance 
(as a harmonious relationship with the immediate natural environment that the indigenous 
peoples inhabit) and a political significance (as self-determination and autonomy outside state 
jurisdiction). This connection identifies the preservation of the environment as integral to the 
wellbeing of indigenous populations, through their livelihood patterns and forms of social 
reproduction. In doing so, it acts to authenticate further claims to territorial sovereignty over 
natural resources.  
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Both associations rely on political legitimacy derived from the definition of territory as 
communal land with collective forms of property, governance and resource management. The 
prohibition of individual property or decisions over resource exploitation is said to act as a social 
mechanism that preserves local ecosystems and biodiversity. The following statement from a 
TIPNIS community leader on the Ninth March demonstrates this vision:  
When the community needs something, we meet and then we know what we are going to 
do. If we sacrifice a tree, well, we will do it together. That is our life, a way of working, 
right? We do not destroy it just like that [ ... ] because we know that the day natural 
resources are finished, we are poor. (Leader of community near River Sécure, personal 
interview, 14 May 2012)  
Therefore, indigenous territorial sovereignty is positioned in contrast to the state’s 
implementation of exploitative development. As such, Adolfo Chávez, the President of CIDOB, 
stated that ‘uncontrolled development brings poverty to our people. For us, it isn’t a contribution, 
it is the destruction of our casa grande’ (personal interview, 27 May 2012). These notions of the 
lowland indigenous peoples as ‘ecologically noble’ are given further credence through national 
frameworks and government documents, such as the Strategic Environmental Assessment of the 
TIPNIS, issued in 2011 by the Ministry of Environment and Water and SERNAP. This report 
frequently suggests there is an integral relationship between the indigenous peoples inhabiting the 
TIPNIS and the natural environment concluding that ‘road policies, tied to the political extension 
of hydrocarbon activities, present cumulative negative effects on the environment which, as 
mentioned, is the fundamental condition for the survival of the adapted indigenous model’ 
(SERNAP – Rumbol, 2011: 7).  
Moreover, indigenous territorial sovereignty is positioned as important in relation to global 
climate change. For instance, during my participation in the Ninth March, indigenous leaders 
frequently spoke of the TIPNIS as the ‘pulmón del mundo’ (lungs of the world) and the ‘corazón 
de agua dulce’ (heart of fresh water) in Bolivia and/or Latin America. Angel Yubanore, the 
Secretary of Justice and Social Participation for CIDOB, explained in his office in Santa Cruz 
that the struggle in defence of the TIPNIS was national and international, as ‘the defence of the 
environment isn’t just for one sector, global warming isn’t going to be for one sector, the 
warming is worldwide, as is the struggle’ (personal interview, 1 March 2012). Furthermore, this 
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narrative is evident in an early declaration from the TIPNIS stating that the ‘destruction of our 
territory [from the road] is also an attack upon humanity as a whole because it will aggravate 
global warming’ (Extraordinary Meeting of Community Leaders of the TIPNIS No. 29, 2010). 
International conventions and summits have been important spaces to counter the Bolivian 
government’s use of rhetorical tools such as Pachamama and vivir bien. In late 2011, members of 
CIDOB and CONAMAQ attended the UNFCCC in Durban, South Africa, where Chávez and one 
of the leaders of CONAMAQ, Rafael Quispe, stated that the Bolivian government is ‘capitalista, 
extractivista y abusivo’ (capitalist, extractivist and abusive) (Los Tiempos, 2011).  
Fundamentally, the perception of the lowland indigenous as living in balance with their 
environment acts as a bridging tool for the construction of allegiances, connections and solidarity 
networks between those defending indigenous territoriality and urban environmental movements. 
A member of the Campaña en Defensa del TIPNIS (Campaign in Defence of the TIPNIS) 
declared that ‘for there to be indigenous [people] there must be jungle, there is no jungle without 
[the indigenous], it works both ways’ (personal interview, 19 January 2011). This echoes the 
view held by many of the activists that territorio indígena is synonymous with an indigenous 
identity, and as such the destruction of their local environment would be tantamount to cultural 
ethnocide. A David-and-Goliath tussle is envisioned that positions the indigenous peoples of the 
TIPNIS as noble saviours of the Amazon standing up to a tyrannical government. For example, at 
a street protest held by the Cochabamba campaign, a student activist brandished a poster that 
displayed the TIPNIS inhabitants as the Na’vi species threatened by the mining activities of a 
colonising power in the 2009 film Avatar (Figure 3). The indigenous are portrayed as defending 
the snakes, birds and trees of the TIPNIS from a bulldozer being driven by Morales, most likely 
mocking his public praise of the film’s ‘profound show of resistance to capitalism and the 
struggle for the defence of nature’ (Huffington Post, 2010).  
Figure 3. ‘Evotar’: Poster on a Protest March in Defence of the TIPNIS in Cochabamba.  
 17 
  
Source: Author’s photo  
Demands for cancellation of the road project, alongside calls for territorial sovereignty, have 
evolved and expanded into discussions over the meanings of development, modernity and 
environmental governance. This has shaped solidarity networks with diverse social movements 
and individual actors, such as environmentalists, academic–activists, feminists, MAS Party 
dissidents and self-titled Trotskyites. Consequently, the Ninth March welcomed the participation 
of all Bolivians (outside political party interests) and was named ‘por la defensa de la vida y 
dignidad, los territorios indígenas, los recursos naturales, la biodiversidad, el medio ambiente, 
las áreas protegidas, el cumplimiento de la Constitución Política del Estado, y el respeto de la 
democracia’ (in defence of life and dignity, indigenous territories, natural resources, biodiversity, 
the environment, protected areas, compliance with the State Constitution and respect for 
democracy). The creation of common identities and grievances is an important component in the 
legitimisation of contemporary indigenous struggles. Therefore, the notion of the marchers as 
ecologically minded peoples was actively reproduced. For instance, the marchers were criticised 
on the Eighth March for the amount of litter they discarded at each camping ground. On the 
Ninth March the leaders were careful to announce a fifteen-minute cleaning-up slot before setting 
off from each site (personal field notes).  
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In many cases, however, these standardised indigenous identities deny the full potential of 
political demands. Bolivian academics, media and activists often portray the indigenous as 
maintaining an alternative world-vision to capitalist models of development. For instance, the 
Bolivian sociologist Raúl Prada has stated that the indigenous marches in defence of the TIPNIS 
are a clear demonstration against ‘the compulsion of extractive development attached to the 
modernist illusion of wealth and consumption’ (Prada, 2012: 160). Yet many indigenous peoples 
and communities actively seek development. For instance, the platform of demands of the Ninth 
March included calls for the construction and implementation of community development models 
according to the vision and self-determination of the indigenous, the recognition of community 
organisations as actors in the mineral and hydrocarbon sectors and the right for communities to 
benefit from the revenues from extractive industries (personal field notes). Nevertheless, internal 
tensions exist within CIDOB and the TIPNIS over issues of land and resource sovereignties. 
Conversations on the Ninth March revealed disagreements about the types of development people 
desire for the TIPNIS. In particular, the marchers differed over whether hydrocarbons should be 
exploited or not and whether indigenous peoples in TCOs should be able to capture additional 
economic revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation in their territories (personal field notes). 
Unsurprisingly, these tensions were silenced in public discourses.  
At certain times, the government has manipulated essentialised indigenous identities to refute 
claims to greater autonomy and self-determination. Ley No. 180 described the TIPNIS as an 
‘intangible’ (untouchable) zone, which would prohibit even inhabitants of the park from using its 
natural resources. As such, members of CIDOB viewed the law as a modest victory that on the 
one hand would cancel the road project but, on the other, would mean that community 
development initiatives already operational within the TIPNIS, such as cacao production and 
caiman hunting, would be suspended. Furthermore, García Linera has countered claims of the 
TIPNIS being an unspoilt territory, or pulmón del mundo, citing allegations of illegal timber sales 
by representatives of the park, such as President of the TIPNIS Sub-central, Fernando Vargas, 
and ex-President of CIDOB, Marcial Fabricano. García Linera thus argues that the TIPNIS is a 
‘un pulmón horadado por la extracción ilegal de madera y cuero, un pulmón con cáncer por la 
nicotina’ (a lung pierced by the illegal extraction of wood and leather, a lung with cancer from 
nicotine) (García Linera, 2012:35). The idealisation of lowland indigenous peoples as living in 
harmonious balance with nature can therefore limit the pursuit of wider political objectives.  
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Alternative Demands for Popular Sovereignty of the People  
Finally, there is the demand for soberanía popular del pueblo pursued by movements on the 
political ‘Left’. This vision postulates a reworking of the nation-state from liberal forms of 
representative democracy to collective forms of decision-making in a self-governing society 
(Máiz, 2008). The principle of popular sovereignty requires that state authority be determined by 
the political consent of the people. Urban movements and activists in defence of the TIPNIS have 
promoted this form of resource sovereignty, which has become a bone of contention in solidarity 
networks with CIDOB.  
Tensions were evident in a meeting in Puerto San Borja to decide the platform of demands for the 
Ninth March. A heated discussion arose over discussion point four, Tierra, Territorio y Madre 
Tierra (Land, Territory and Mother Earth). Conversation quickly turned to natural resource 
governance, with little reference to the protection of the environment or biodiversity. Indigenous 
representatives from CIDOB and the TIPNIS specified their desire for greater economic rights 
over their lands and resources, arguing that the government must be the one to guarantee these 
jurisdictional rights for the indigenous peoples. The agenda focused around the right to self-
determination, namely the right to decide their own forms of development through their 
respective decision-making structures and the right to prior consultation over projects initiated by 
the state or international corporations. However, representatives from the highland indigenous 
organisation CONAMAQ were much more vocal about the need to sustain the harmonious 
balance between humans and nature, arguing that neither state-led nor foreign-led capital would 
be acceptable as long as neo-extractivism continued. These debates between the indigenous 
marchers provoked a response from one of the urban activists, a so-called ‘MAS dissident’, who 
argued that the indigenous cannot be the only ones to decide the future of natural resources, 
because national development is in the interest of all Bolivians. Rather, reiterating calls for 
popular sovereignty, he argued that the whole country has the right to communal development. 
Furthermore, he asserted the right of urban solidarity movements to be involved in the debates 
since the TIPNIS is a national protected area and therefore of concern to all Bolivians (personal 
field notes). It is important to note, though, that indigenous groups have rarely made explicit 
demands for territorial enclosure, instead demanding political representation and participation in 
the state through their respective organisational structures.  
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Conclusions  
Several competing resource sovereignty claims were made during the TIPNIS conflict. Relying 
on legitimacy politics, notions of indigeneity have been coupled with identities based on 
environmental harmony in the formation of both state-led resource nationalism and demands for 
indigenous territoriality by the Amazonian indigenous peoples. The active praxis of eco-politics 
renegotiates the power relations embedded within indigenous–state interactions, as well as 
authenticating resource sovereignty claims amongst the wider Bolivian populace.  
The importance of the issues discussed in this article is underlined by the rise in indigenous 
nationalisms being played out within the Latin American region alongside the pursuit of neo-
extractive development models. State-led resource nationalism has in some cases aggravated land 
and resource struggles. In Bolivia, the monopolisation of indigenous identity-making by the 
government has become a sticking point in the plurinational agenda. A fuller process of 
decolonising the nation-state would need to encompass plural understandings of development, 
nature, democracy and territoriality through the self-determination of indigenous populations. 
Until this occurs, the state will continue to play out colonial relations of domination that 
politically, economically and culturally marginalise certain sectors of the indigenous population.  
Questions therefore remain over whether and how individual and communal interests can be 
reconciled and how indigenous peoples can be incorporated as active citizens within Bolivia. 
However, as Gustafson (2009) aptly points out, plurinationalism is a process, rather than an 
established model. This process will be shaped by resource conflicts in the years to come. For 
now, though, in the lead-up to the 2014 presidential elections where Morales will run for a third 
term, the government has taken the decision to suspend the road project through the TIPNIS.  
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